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Abstract This paper considers how to harmonize the demands of good scholarship with 
professional and ethical courtesy towards our colleagues in written and unwritten 
academic work. In the nineteenth century, W.K.Clifford and William James introduced 
the notion of an ethics of belief: a set of quasi-moral rules governing the formation of 
opinions. Using the Clifford/James debate plus J.S.Mill’s discussion of freedom of speech 
as points of departure, this paper takes some first steps towards formulating an ethics of 
argumentation: a set of principles governing the ways scholars critically dialogue with 
the views of others. Candidates for such principles in the philosopher’s or logician’s 
repertoire include the principle of charity, playing author’s or devil’s advocate, and 
injunctions against attacking ‘straw man’ arguments. The paper considers how to 
reconcile our duties towards certain intellectual positions with our duties to those 
persons proposing these positions. 
 
Key Ideas 
•    There is such a thing as the ethics of belief: a set of quasi-moral dos or donts 
governing the way we form beliefs. 
•    The ethics of belief provides a model for developing an ethics of argumentation.  
•    The so-called principle of charity is an obvious candidate for a principle underlying 
the ethics of argumentation. 
•    The good intentions underlying the principle of charity sometimes lead to 
patronising interpretations of the arguments of other people. 
•    The principle of charity must be used sensitively if we are to balance the interests of 
arguers against the interests of the intellectual positions that people propose to us.   
 
Discussion Question 1: How do we balance our duty to engage in inquiry against our 
responsibilities in handling the writings and ideas of others? 
Discussion Question 2: Do our moral and professional duties extend beyond the 
people proposing arguments to the arguments themselves? 
Discussion Question 3: Does the principle of charity in interpretation help or hinder 
our efforts to understand other people’s positions or points of view? 
Discussion Question 4: Is it possible to be too ‘charitable’ in interpreting the 
arguments of others?  
 
This paper makes an exploratory foray into a relatively unexamined academic 
nook: the ethics of academic discourse. We will be posing and attempting to 
answer questions of the following kind. Does it make sense to speak of an ethics 
of argumentation? If so, how might the ethical principles governing good handling 
of argument shape the ways in which we as academics report and respond to the 
written words of other people? Are there implicit principles that we adopt in 
ethically conducting ourselves in relation to the words, writings and discourse of 
other people? 
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What I am hoping to achieve here under the heading of the Ethics of 
Argumentation finds a precedent in what has come to be known as the Ethics of 
Belief. An Ethics of Belief talks about what it is right or wrong to do, what is 
acceptable or unacceptable behaviour, when it comes to forming and expressing 
beliefs. An Ethics of Belief was most famously propounded in William Kingdom 
Clifford’s 1877 essay ‘The Ethics of Belief’.  
It is a relatively small step, from recognising the existence of an ethics of belief, 
to recognising the existence of an ethics of argumentation and academic 
discourse. An ethics of argumentation does for argumentative discourse what an 
ethics of belief attempts to achieve in the area of belief-formation: identifying 
principles governing good (ethical) practice in framing and proposing arguments, 
plus describing appropriate behaviour to adopt when answering the arguments 
and reasoned opinions of other people. Both believers and arguers must go 
through similar intellectual labours whenever they undertake the processes of 
sifting, weighing and assessing evidence. Therefore, one of the questions we 
might expect an ethics of belief and an ethics of argumentation to answer is, 
what constitutes an adequate or exemplary effort at evaluating evidence? When 
have I done enough to ‘earn’ my professed opinion? Of course, there is one 
obvious difference between the two ethics. For whereas an ethics of belief serves 
to determine when (if ever) I have earned my belief, an ethics of argumentation 
serves to determine when I have done enough to establish the conclusion of a 
line of reasoning. Whereas belief implies commitment on the part of the believer, 
the conclusion to an argument may or may not be something that the speaker 
consciously subscribes to herself. Along the way to proving her main thesis, an 
academic might test, briefly entertain and endorse, then ultimately reject, a 
series of sub-arguments. We cannot expect equal intellectual commitment to 
every claim that is supported by argument in the course of an academic paper.1 
Section I below discusses some of the considerations that might fall under the 
remit of an ethics of academic discourse. Here I consider what we understand by 
the terms ‘academic discourse’ and ‘disputation’. Section II sketches our intuitive 
understanding of exemplary behaviour in the realm of written academic dispute. 
To illustrate the significance of the term ‘ethics’ in the phrase ‘ethics of academic 
discourse’, section III provides a brief sketch of Clifford’s attempt to provide an 
Ethics of Belief. Philosophers working in the area of informal logic are accustomed 
to discussing principles governing practices in handling and responding to other 
people’s arguments. Most commonly invoked here is the Principle of Charity (in 
interpreting arguments and texts); and related to this, the principles of playing 
 
1 This claim is at variance with the view expressed in Schreier, Groeben and Christmann (1995:274) 
which suggests a sincerity condition for argumentation whereby participants in an argumentation must 
‘express only such opinions and convictions (and argue in their favour) which they themselves regard 
as correct’. Points of agreement and variation between Schreier, Groeben and Christmann’s social 
definition and a more philosophical definition of argumentation will emerge in the discussion below. 
There is no tension between the two views once we realise that an academic who is considering and 
rejecting arguments in the course of a paper is advocating views on behalf of absent participants in an 
ongoing academic debate. 
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author’s advocate and devil’s advocate. Of these, the principle of charity has 
received widest coverage and discussion. Sections IV and V discuss popular uses 
of the Principle of Charity within two philosophical arenas: 
(1) The arena of argument interpretation or argument reconstruction within 
the realm of informal logic.  
 
(2) The area of what philosophers and social scientists following W.V.O. Quine 
and Donald Davidson call radical interpretation (Davidson) and radical 
translation (Quine).  
Throughout these sections, I shall be considering how the principle of charity 
might function as a principle governing the ethics of academic discourse. Finally, 
Section VI briefly summarises and brings together the threads of argument. 
 
I 
Many people will have encountered some notions of informal logic through 
studying a short course in critical thinking or argumentation. If so, they will be 
familiar with the received wisdom that an argument is an attempt to provide 
evidence for some point of view (Groarke and Tindale, 2004:2). An argument is a 
set of claims some of which lend support to another claim. The claim receiving 
support is dubbed the conclusion to the argument whilst the statements providing 
reasons for accepting a conclusion are the argument’s premises. 
Philosophers who define argument as offering reasons in support of a conclusion 
have sometimes overlooked the fact that the notion of argument functions as a 
social, pragmatic and rhetorical device, as well as a rational/logical one. Writing 
from a psycholinguistic point of view, Schreier, Groeben and Christmann (1995: 
272) define an argumentation as a form of social interaction whereby 
the participants attempt to find a solution to a controversial issue by means 
of a partner-/listener-oriented exchange of views that is based on (good) 
reasons and made acceptable to all participants (in a cooperative manner). 
A purely philosophical definition of argument and the definition offered by 
Schreier et al. do not amount to different perspectives on a single phenomenon. 
We cannot brush over the difference by observing that ‘argumentation constitutes 
both a sequence of arguments – i.e. of products – and a communicative process’ 
(Schreier et al. 1995: 273). This is because the two notions of argumentation can 
have mutually conflicting goals. The goal of argument as reason-giving is, in the 
words of Schreier et al., to create results of ‘generalizability’ (1995: 275). The 
goal of argument as a (rational and co-operative) exchange of opinion is to arrive 
at a conclusion that is acceptable to all parties, doing this in a way that offers 
relatively equal floor-time to participants to shape and express their own 
opinions. In other words, argument as co-operative exchange relies upon some 
notion of procedural justice (Schreier et al. 1995:275), a notion largely missing 
from the concept of argumentation as reason-giving. From a purely logical point 
of view, arguments which give insufficient reasons for accepting their conclusions 
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should not receive equal airing with those good arguments which offer compelling 
evidence for their conclusions. Once we have satisfied ourselves that an argument 
is bad, we should quickly move on to more promising forms of reason-giving. 
In light of these two very different notions of argumentation, it is perhaps not 
surprising that recent books on informal logic and critical thinking tend to stress 
the dialogic nature of argument. Under this more recent conception of the matter, 
an argument is not something static on a page, but the real words of real people 
looking to persuade others, with the words on the page functioning as a written 
record of real or imagined exchanges of opinion. According to Walton (2006:1) 
the conclusion to an argument makes a claim that is “seen as open to doubt, and 
the reason for giving the reason is to remove that doubt. For Walton, “the notion 
of an argument is best elucidated in terms of its purpose when used in dialogue”. 
Throughout this paper, I will call this dialogic understanding of argument 
disputation, distinguishing this from the more traditional definition of an 
argument. 
The dialogic view of argumentation (argument as disputation) provides a better 
model for academic discourse than the static reasons-in-support-of-a-conclusion 
model. It is possible to view an argument on the page as self-contained and 
complete. However, to the extent she is providing reasons for her views, the 
academic writer is anticipating the needs of a potential audience for her writing. It 
is important to remember too that most academic writing is embedded in a 
context of previous scholarship and disputation upon a topic. In the ideal case, 
the prime purpose of conducting a literature review should not be to display prior 
reading on the topic (though for many academics, this becomes the purpose of 
the exercise).2 Instead, a literature review should locate one’s current 
contribution against the background of a particular academic debate. The purpose 
of academic enquiry is to show that something is in doubt or dispute, and to find 
ways to resolve that doubt or dispute. Any published academic paper is the 
writer’s contribution to a moment in that debate. The fact that this contribution is 
frozen in time in a written article should not distract us from the essentially 
dialogic nature of academic enquiry.  
Concentrating upon the dialogic nature of argument helpfully reminds us of the 
different stakeholders whose interests we must take into account when deciding 
how to ethically discharge our duties as writing and disputing academics. These 
stakeholders in the arena of academic debate include 
• The writer herself 
 
2 And perhaps not even this much. Harris (1994:440) deplores a style of citation whereby authors 
“follow the writing of an ordinary sentence with a string of names in parentheses that refer the reader 
without comment to a set of texts listed at the end of the article”. Harris theorises that “such listings 
of names are a kind of paying of rent, a granting of rights to certain terms or ideas, as well as proof 
that the author has done some homework.” As well as denying to the writers listed the rights of 
“agents making claims whose particulars are now being disputed, extended, or qualified”, “the names 
in parentheses serve as a metonymy for a bank of knowledge that the author hopes somehow to 
enlarge”. Of course, because this style of citation fails to engage with the texts it invokes, it fails to 
position the current writer’s contribution within a larger debate. 
Page 5 of 23  
 
4th Asia Pacific Conference on Educational Integrity (4APCEI) 28–30 September 2009 
University of Wollongong NSW Australia 
Refereed Paper 
• The person or persons whose views she is amending, extending, or 
replacing with her own 
• The immediate academic audience of the writing 
• Our students 
• The wider public 
• The argument or theoretical position being argued for.  
I shall have more to say about the role and interests of these various 
stakeholders as the paper proceeds. All of these seem uncontroversial bar the 
last. Some might wonder whether an argument or a theoretical position is the 
sort of thing that we can be said to have duties towards. In his discussion of 
freedom of speech, John Stuart Mill comes close to suggesting that we have a 
duty to the opposing argument in any dispute: 
Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this 
condition …. they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of 
those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons 
may have to say; and, consequently, they do not, in any proper sense of 
the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess…. Nor is [the 
truth] ever really known but to those who have attended equally and 
impartially to both sides and endeavoured to see the reasons of both in the 
strongest light. So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of 
moral and human subjects that, if opponents of all-important truths do not 
exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with the 
strongest arguments which the most skilful devil’s advocate can conjure up. 
(Mill, 1978:35-36). 
What Mill presents as a duty to the argument itself - a duty to envisage and 
anticipate the best reasons that can be put for the opinion opposed to your own - 
really collapses into an indirect duty to the believer (to provide a firm foundation 
for one’s own belief, by equipping oneself with the means to defend that belief) 
and to an opponent’s argument (to represent that argument fairly and fully 
before disagreeing with it). The exercise Mill describes here of conjuring up an 
imaginary opponent suggests that the practice of presenting carefully and fully 
the arguments we oppose en route to refuting these, can also service the needs 




As we saw in the previous section, we operate with two different notions of 
argumentation: the rational/logical and the rhetorical/social. There is a sense in 
which writers of academic papers (philosophers included!) are engaging in both 
notions of argumentation. A paper cannot be well-reasoned unless it positions 
itself within a debate, via a well-framed literature review that fairly reports 
intellectual positions previously taken by other academics on the same or similar 
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topics. Attention to the rhetorical/social dimension of academic writing demands 
that we operate with some notion of good conduct in academic writing. 
What constitutes good conduct in academic writing? In a rare paper providing 
advice to those looking to publish a refutation of a scientific paper, Hyman neatly 
summarises good ethical practice in academic refutation:  
A good reply is one that amends, elaborates, or otherwise clarifies and 
expands issues raised by the target article without disparaging the 
contributions of the original author (Hyman, 1995:182). 
Hyman’s paper discusses the ‘dos’ and ‘donts’ of written disputation. In passim, 
Hyman identifies a number of potential motives of persons writing rebuttals. I list 
these motives in descending order of intellectual and moral merit:3 
(a) To add to the understanding of an issue 
(b) To make a constructive contribution to the topic of the original paper 
(c) To persuade interested, but previously neutral readers, to your position 
(d) To set the record straight 
(e) To clear one’s name 
(f) To demonstrate your intellectual superiority to your opponent 
(g) To humiliate your adversary 
Those looking for normative principles governing the good conduct of academic 
discourse will not find these in Hyman’s paper. This is because what Hyman offers 
is practical advice, based upon personal experience, for authors looking to have 
their refutations published. Any principles drawn from Hyman’s paper constitute 
what Immanuel Kant dubbed hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives.4 
That is to say, Hyman’s principles will not be rationally binding upon all would-be 
moral agents; these rules will only influence the actions of those who possess a 
particular desire. So following Hyman, we might say: “If you desire to have your 
refutation published in an academic journal, then you ought to write a paper 
which makes a constructive contribution to the topic of the original paper and 
adds to the understanding of the original issue, with a view to persuading 
interested but previously neutral readers to your position. You ought not to be 
motivated purely by the desire to set the record straight and clear your own 
 
3 Some readers may be uncertain that motives (a) to (d) reflect a descending order of merit. The 
ordering here implies that interests in persuading to one’s position, and setting the record straight, 
are more personal and therefore less ‘academically worthy’ than the relatively disinterested desires to 
add to the understanding of an issue or to make a constructive contribution to a topic. 
4 “Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the 
attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will)….. A hypothetical imperative thus 
says only that an action is good for some purpose or other, either possible or actual.” By contrast, a 
categorical imperative is a moral rule that commands a form of conduct “without being based on, and 
conditioned by, any further purpose to be attained by a certain line of conduct” (Kant, 2002:44, 46). 
Thus a moral rule is a categorical command to ‘do x’ regardless of the particular desires or motives of 
the agent. 
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name, by writing a paper which demonstrates your intellectual superiority to your 
opponent in a way which humiliates your opponent.” To the extent that all 
academics may be presumed to share the broad aims which Hyman describes (to 
find an audience, and have their opinions recognised through publication in a way 
which leads to career advancement), this suggests that Hyman’s imperative 
should be rationally binding upon all academics. Alas, in the real world, people 
often lose sight of these worthy goals. Too many academics engaged in 
disputation allow themselves to be governed by motives (d) through (g); and for 
this reason, we perhaps require real rules and principles to regulate the bounds of 
decent behaviour in disputation. 
Some confirmation that Hyman is articulating our intuitive sense of good 
argumentative conduct can be found in the empirical study undertaken by 
Schreier et al. (1995). In this study, subjects were asked to evaluate rhetorical 
argumentative strategies according to unfairness and to classify them into 
groups. Inter alia, Scheier et al.’s eleven-cluster solution offers the following 
standards of unfair argumentation: 
8. Do not, even by negligence, discredit other participants. 
9. Do not intentionally act towards your adversary in the matter at hand 
as though he were your personal enemy. 
10. Do not intentionally interact with others in such a way as to impede 
their participation.  
In what follows, I will adopt Hyman’s recommendation as a broad outline of the 
territory to be covered by an ethics of academic writing, and a description of the 
broad destination our enquiry should lead to. To paraphrase his summary, adding 
reference to good and bad motives for publication,  
Good academic discourse is writing that adds to the understanding of an 
issue and makes a constructive contribution to the topic of a previous paper 
by amending, elaborating, or otherwise clarifying and expanding issues 
raised by the target article with a view to persuading interested, but 
previously neutral readers, to your position. Such writing achieves all of this 
without disparaging the contributions of the original author(s). 
Hyman’s paper describes nothing more or less than our sense of what constitutes 
fair discussion for the purposes of academic disputation. As such, Hyman’s paper 
offers a clear sense of what we believe to be the ideal in academic writing. 
However, the hard work lies in finding rules and principles to enforce this 
behavioural ideal. At the end of chapter two of On Liberty, in a discussion that 
mirrors much of the ground covered by Hyman, John Stuart Mill considers the 
view that the limits of freedom of expression of opinions should coincide with our 
notion of what constitutes fair discussion. Mill notes the difficulty of determining 
where the bounds of fair discussion should be placed.5 If we are governed by the 
 
5 The difficulty of specifying the limits of fair discussion points to a weakness in Schreier et al.’s 
specification of four conditions that contributions to an argumentation should meet if they are to count 
as both rational and co-operative (1995: 273-275). Conditions 3 and 4 are ‘justice on the content 
level: arguments must be just towards other participants’ and ‘procedural justice/communicativity’ 
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thought that a fair attack on an opponent is one which does not cause offence, 
then Mill points out that “offence is given whenever the attack on an opinion is 
telling and powerful”, a point Hyman attests through his personal experience 
(Mill, 1859:50; Hyman, 1995:178).  
Arguably, the ideal that Hyman describes applies not simply to cases of 
intellectual disputation, but to good discussion and discourse in a broader sense. 
This suggests that the rules governing academic discourse might prove to be 
nothing more or less than the rules of good discourse, period. To help understand 
what the rules of good disputation would look like, I now explore the parallels 
between an ethics of argumentation and an ethics of belief, by considering 
Clifford’s famous essay on the Ethics of Belief. 
 
III 
Prima facie, there are three different dimensions along which we might be 
tempted to judge a belief; and therefore three possible sources for the subject 
matter of an ethics of belief. These dimensions are: 
1. The matter of belief. The matter of belief describes the what-believed: 
whatever follows the word ‘that’ when we report the content of a 
belief. Thus when we say “She believes that the earth is flat”, the 
clause ‘the earth is flat’ describes the content or matter of her belief. 
2. The manner of belief, where this describes the process or method by 
which the belief was acquired. 
3. The manner of expression, describing where or when, on what 
occasions, we choose to share our beliefs with other people. 
Starting with J.S.Mill, it is a doctrine of modern liberalism that it is not the belief 
held, but the manner of its expression, that makes the believer morally culpable.6 
Viewed as a proposition or thing said, the content of my belief can be judged true 
or false, but not moral or immoral. The language of moral culpability takes hold in 
the area of belief only when we think about the manner in which we acquire belief 
(responsibly or irresponsibly; carelessly or carefully; scrupulously or 
unscrupulously) and the occasions upon which we choose to express beliefs. This 
suggests that as a first approximation, we wish to say that the proper subject 
matter of an ethics of belief is 2. In other words, an ethics of belief is an ethical 
assessment of the activities of belief-formation and belief-expression, as opposed 
to an ethical assessment of the content of what is believed. Clifford does not so 
 
whereby ‘all participants must equally have the opportunity to contribute towards a solution’ to the 
point in dispute. To this writer at least, it is not clear how justice on the ‘content level’ differs from 
procedural justice. If content level justice amounts to the view that we should not misrepresent the 
meaning or logical force of our interlocutors’ arguments, then Mill’s concerns re fairness in discussion 
become relevant.  
6 Degenhardt (1998:333) suggests that “at first glance, the idea of an ethics of belief (content) may 
seem unattractive – all right for medieval inquisitors or for modern advocates of political correctness 
but hardly palatable to enthusiasts for liberal democratic values.”  
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much condemn people for the beliefs they hold, as for the manner in which they 
acquire their beliefs.7 
W.K.Clifford set the stakes for ethically acquired belief very high when he wrote 
that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence.” (Clifford, 1947:77). According to Clifford, our prime 
epistemic obligation is to withhold belief wherever we detect an insufficiency of 
evidence. Some commentators would interpret a Cliffordian position as 
simultaneously obliging us to commit to belief in the presence of sufficient 
evidence. This implies that withholding belief from insufficiently determined 
propositions is the same thing as forming belief in the presence of sufficient or 
compelling evidence.8 If we treat these as the same, we are attributing to Clifford 
the position that we should be led wherever the evidence takes us. However, it is 
by no means clear that these amount to the same thing. If for no other reason, 
the fact that Clifford couches his overriding thesis re belief in negative terms, as 
duties of withholding belief, leads one to assume that a Cliffordian could fulfil his 
epistemic obligations by withholding belief wherever there is insufficient evidence, 
whilst as a matter of policy maintaining his epistemic caution to such an extent 
that he allows his belief to remain underdetermined by otherwise impeccably 
strong evidence.  
What Clifford offers is an extreme form of the view known as evidentialism, which 
says that belief in a factual issue may legitimately be based only (solely and 
wholly) on considerations of evidential fact (Meiland, 1980:15). The notion that 
belief should be based on sufficient evidence is at one level uncontroversial. 
Meiland describes this doctrine as “one of the cornerstones of modern Western 
thought” (Meiland, 1980:15); whilst Gale (1980:1) dubs Clifford’s principle ‘the 
Scientific Credo’. However, the vehemence with which Clifford states his principle9 
masks the fact that in making this claim, Clifford fails to offer any realistic 
practical guide or rule of thumb that will aid in identifying our duties in the area of 
belief-formation. This is because believing on insufficient evidence can correspond 
with a number of specific failures of our epistemic duty.  
(1) In the first place, forming belief in the absence of sufficient evidence may be 
a matter of believing too hastily. We believe too hastily wherever we form hasty 
generalisations, or where we justify isolated beliefs through nothing more 
 
7 Dagenhardt (1998:333) distinguishes an ethics of belief (content) from an ethics of belief (manner). 
What Dagenhardt places under the heading of an ethics of belief (content) includes examples of racist 
views, and other views people generally find to be unacceptable. Whether the moral offence 
associated with these beliefs reflects their content, or whether the offence arises from the manner or 
occasion of their expression, is a matter beyond the scope of this paper to decide.  
8 Thus Meiland (1980:15) reduces evidentialism (the doctrine held by Clifford) to two normative 
principles: (i) one ought not to believe on insufficient evidence; and (ii) one ought to believe whatever 
is backed by sufficient evidence. This paragraph challenges the view that (i) entails (ii) or that (ii) is 
tantamount to (i), on the ground that (ii) involves greater epistemic commitment, on the part of the 
would-be believer, than does (i).  
9 Degenhardt (1998:335) describes Clifford’s ethics of belief as simultaneously ‘bland’ and 
‘demanding’. 
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substantial than an appeal to authority. Cases of appeal to authority are cases 
where we choose to believe something because the source of that belief happens 
to be an established authority figure. Those who accept urban myths demonstrate 
an extreme version of the latter, when they uncritically accept what many people 
wrongly regard an adequate transmission line of evidence: the word of a “friend 
of a friend of a friend”. 
(2) Clifford’s essay introduces the story of a fictitious shipowner who doubted the 
seaworthiness of his craft but managed nonetheless to persuade himself that all 
was well: 
He said to himself that she had gone safely through so many voyages and 
weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she would not come 
safely home from this trip also…. In such ways he acquired a sincere and 
comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; 
he watched her departure with a light heart … and he got his insurance-
money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales. (Clifford, p.70) 
Clifford’s imaginary shipowner’s fault is one of evidence suppression, for he 
formed his belief by suppressing doubts and avoiding investigation. 
(3) Further cases of believing upon insufficient evidence involve a form of 
belief inertia. This describes what happens when an individual indulges the 
natural human tendency to protect the beliefs one already possesses, by not 
allowing these to come into conflict with contravening evidence. Thus Clifford 
describes the individual type who 
holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of 
afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it 
in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of 
men that call in question or discuss it, and regards as impious those 
questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing it. (Clifford, 
1877: 74) 
Whereas Clifford talks about believing on insufficient evidence, most of his 
examples would be better described as cases of evidence suppression. This is not 
surprising, since the notion that we might lack sufficient evidence upon which to 
form our belief goes against our experience of modern life. Far from having too 
little evidence at our disposal with which to form adequate belief, we often find 
ourselves weighing up too much information. In a world of increasing technocratic 
complexity where we have access to so much information, it is impossible for any 
one individual to know or investigate many topics in real depth. The proliferation 
of information in recent times therefore has created a division of cognitive labour, 
whereby we trust recognised experts to investigate particular subject areas on 
our behalf. In many cases, this division of cognitive labour extends beyond the 
lay-person to the semi-expert.10  
 
10 Hyman (1995:178) notes that even the readers of journals are not interested in the minutiae of 
technical detail, but are content to trust the handling of such details to the disputants themselves.  
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The presence of a proliferation of experts and proliferation of evidence raises 
uncertainty in the lay-person’s mind re the relative weight to assign to different 
principles and lines of evidence. Current debates on global warming are a good 
illustration of the perplexity that may arise as we read the views of so-called 
‘experts’. A recent review of Ian Plimer’s book Heaven and Earth describes well 
the current layperson’s dilemma.11 
In recommending that individuals have a duty to investigate the grounds of their 
beliefs for themselves, both Clifford and Mill apparently defy this principle of the 
division of cognitive labour. The reason for this denial is because both Mill and 
Clifford see risks in failing to think matters through for ourselves. For Mill, the 
risks primarily are to the individual, whose failure to confront the full position of 
his opponents would leave him ill-equipped to defend his beliefs in the face of 
opposition,12 but also leave the individual with no real understanding of the 
nuances of his own position. What Mill describes in the quote given above are 
risks which seem real to academics as opposed to laypeople. For Clifford even 
moreso than for Mill, there is a risk to society as a whole whenever we fail to 
adequately form our beliefs. This is because Clifford stresses the social 
consequences of belief, the fact that belief is not an individual possession, but 
something impacting upon all of humanity: 
Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, 
are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age….. 
It is not only the leader of men, statesman, philosopher, or poet, that owes 
this bounden duty to mankind…. Every hard-worked wife of an artisan may 
transmit to her children beliefs which shall knit society together, or rend it 
in pieces. No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the 
universal duty of questioning all that we believe. (Clifford, 1947:74-5) 
Beliefs have social consequences and for that reason, must be held ‘ethically’, on 
the basis of the best evidence to be obtained through conscientious investigation 
(Hollinger, 1997:76). Society as a whole pays for lax standards of belief. Clifford 
is unequivocal on this point: the person who fails to scrutinise his beliefs commits 
an offence against society, and that offence is tantamount to ‘theft’: 
 
11 According to the review,  
 Plimer sets out to refute the scientific consensus that human emissions of CO2 have changed 
the climate. He states in his acknowledgements that the book evolved from a dinner in London 
with three young lawyers who believed the consensus. As Plimer writes: “Although these three 
had more than adequate intellectual material to destroy the popular paradigm, they had 
neither the scientific knowledge nor the scientific training to pull it apart stitch by stitch. This 
was done at dinner.” 
Not surprisingly, the reviewer (Ashley, 2009) goes on to throw doubt upon Plimer’s claim that he 
could demonstrate this much over dinner: 
If Plimer is right and he is able to show that the work of literally thousands of oceanographers, 
solar physicists, biologists, atmospheric scientists, geologists, and snow and ice researchers 
during the past 100 years is fundamentally flawed, then it would rank as one of the greatest 
discoveries of the century and would almost certainly earn him a Nobel prize. This is the scale 
of Plimer’s claim. 
12 See quotation from Mill in Section I above (p.4). 
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If the belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence, the pleasure is a 
stolen one. Not only does it deceive ourselves [sic] by giving us a sense of 
power which we do not really possess, but it is sinful because it is stolen in 
defiance of our duty to mankind (Clifford, 1947:75). 
According to Bergeron’s interpretation, Clifford’s ethics of belief begins from the 
premise that we have a prima facie obligation to avoid risk to ourselves and 
others. Clifford condemns lax habits in the formation of belief because there are 
real risks to society as a whole wherever we fail to form adequate beliefs; and 
this means any policy of forming our beliefs lightly contradicts our duty to 
humanity to minimize the risks of our actions (Bergeron, 2006:75).  
Clifford’s and Mill’s essays have a very dated air to modern ears. As Dagenhardt 
notes, Clifford’s essay belongs to a culture “where truth and knowledge were 
taken seriously and had not become words to be put in apologetic scare quotes” 
(Dagenhardt, 1998:335). In a world of relativised truth and belief, we have grown 
inured to the possibility of real diversity of opinions; and now we only hope to 
exercise control over the circumstances in which these differences are expressed. 
As a result, people today are more exercised by the rules governing belief 
expression (i.e. identifying those contexts where it is or isn’t suitable to express 
certain beliefs) and less concerned to identify rules governing the process of 
belief formation. Yet however strident we might find the expression of Clifford’s 
and Mill’s views, that stridency of tone points to the high moral stakes that some 
people believe are involved in belief formation. Whilst the way in which he 
expresses his views may seem quaint to us, nonetheless Clifford’s discussion of 
an ethics of belief points the way to the forms of language we would expect to 
find in an ethics of academic discourse (talk of duties and what we must or must 
not, should or should not do).  
 
IV 
Clifford’s ethics of belief utilizes the language of duty when describing the 
formation of our beliefs. In a similar way, an ethics of academic discourse should 
specify our duties as good disputants. And, although Clifford’s essay offered little 
advice re how we might meet that duty, ideally an ethics of disputation should 
provide some practical principles that will help us to meet our duties qua 
academic disputants. Just as Clifford described the policies that should inform our 
manner of believing, so too an ethics of disputation should offer policies which 
shape the manner of our reporting and commenting upon the viewpoints of other 
academics. 
With a little rewording, Hyman’s description of the terrain of disputation 
generates a description of the ‘duties’ of an academic writer:  
Those engaged in disputation have a duty to write something which adds to 
the understanding of an issue and makes a constructive contribution to the 
topic of a previous paper by amending, elaborating, or otherwise clarifying 
and expanding issues raised by the target article with a view to persuading 
interested, but previously neutral readers, to their position. Academic 
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disputants have a further duty to achieve all of this without disparaging the 
contributions of the original author(s). 
This still leaves us with the task of describing the principles that guide us in the 
pursuit of this duty. Given the prominent role played by argument in academic 
discourse, it makes sense to start looking for the ethical principles governing 
academic writing by considering the rules which govern the handling of 
arguments. Within the realm of logic, we find a number of such principles of a 
more or less formal nature. Candidate for rules of good logical conduct include 
the injunction to try and understand your opponent’s argument, rather than 
attacking a straw man argument or weak imitation of your opponent’s view; plus 
the injunction to attack the position and not the person (i.e. avoid argument ad 
hominem).13 Perhaps the informal principle of good argument that has received 
most philosophical attention is the so-called Principle of Charity. The remainder of 
this paper focuses upon this principle to see what lessons it holds for an ethics of 
disputation.  
In its broadest terms, the Principle of Charity is a principle of leniency in judging 
others (Hyman, 1995:181), which calls upon us to give people ‘the benefit of the 
doubt’. As such, the principle of charity has application in various walks of life. 
Because the person operating the principle of charity in a given context will 
generally have some aim or goal in mind the use of this principle can be 
differentiated according to the underlying purpose of the person who applies it. 
For example, in the case of a primary school teacher the principle of charity might 
amount to the injunction that, until she has evidence to the contrary, she may 
assume that children generally tell the truth. In the political arena the principle 
might tell us to excuse the manner in which a political conviction is expressed 
(i.e. the vehemence of the sentiment), and attend only to the policy or practical 
proposal offered. 
Within a philosophical context, the Principle of Charity is applied by people whose 
primary academic goal is to understand and evaluate arguments, positions and 
points of view. Within this context, the Principle of Charity is at the very least a 
form of academic good manners in the matter of interpreting arguments. All 
things being equal and until we have evidence to the contrary, we assume that 
the person who is arguing with us or presenting a case sincerely holds a coherent 
position and also can offer some reasons for that position. When a philosopher 
attacks that position, she first takes pains to ensure that she understands the 
position properly and hasn’t misrepresented it (by arguing against a ‘straw man’ 
rather than the full position). Secondly, she probes the strength of the reasons 
given for holding that position, but also the consistency of the claims made within 
the position. Exposing inconsistencies is done, not with a view to scoring points 
off someone or making them look bad, but with a view to advancing the sum of 
human knowledge for everyone, and not only the person whose view is being 
attacked. 
 
13 For a quick overview of good versus bad uses of ad hominem argument, see Warburton, 1996:3-4. 
For fuller discussions, see Groarke and Tindale, 2004:369-372; Tindale, 2007:81-97; and Walton, 
2006:122-128.  
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Viewed as a tool for logical interpretation, the Principle of Charity may be 
formulated in different ways. According to Alec Fisher (2004:17-18): 
[the Principle of Charity]says that if interpreting as reasoning a passage which 
is not obviously reasoning yields only bad arguments, assume it is not 
reasoning. (The rationale for this approach is that we are interested in finding 
out the truth about things rather than in scoring points off people.)  
Quite often, the thought underlying the application of this principle is to ensure 
fairness in attributing positions to other people. Groarke and Tindale (2004:18) 
and Tindale (2007) treat the intention underlying the Principle of Charity as one 
of not misinterpreting other people’s arguments in a way that misrepresents their 
intentions (e.g. finding bad or fallacious arguments that the person never 
intended to bring forward).  
Few of the arguments encountered in daily life take the form of well-structured 
strings of premises which logically compel assent to their conclusions. Most 
‘argument’ we hear is truncated, offered in snatches with incomplete lines of 
reasoning apparently supporting conclusions; or else we discover sets of reasons 
in support of conclusions which we can’t identify. An example of an argument 
with missing premises would be: 
Everyone should learn self-hypnosis because it’s one of the best ways to 
reduce stress.14 
The inference from the premise (‘self-hypnosis is one of the best ways to reduce 
stress’) to the conclusion (‘everyone should learn self-hypnosis’) can only be 
made via the bridging assumption ‘reducing stress is a worthwhile goal for 
everyone’.15  
In other words, many or most natural language ‘arguments’ are really 
enthymemes, incomplete arguments with missing (unstated) premises or 
conclusions, or both (Walton and Reed, 2005:339). Walton suggests “an 
enthymeme, in current usage, is an argument that has one or more premises, or 
possibly a conclusion, not explicitly stated in the text, but that needs to have 
these propositions explicitly stated to extract the complete argument from the 
text.” We can call the missing premise(s) or conclusion(s) nonexplicit 
assumptions (Walton, 2001:93). In other words, for much of the time we are 
responding to arguments, the task of interpretation turns into that of argument 
reconstruction. And where more than one interpretation or reconstruction is 
possible, the Principle of Charity comes into its own, giving us grounds to choose 
between competing interpretations of an argument (Walton & Reed, 2005:341).  
One extreme approach to argument reconstruction is the view known as 
Deductivism in logic. Deductivism says that all naturally occurring arguments 
 
14 The example is from Walton and Reed (2005:349). 
15 As is the case here, quite often the missing premise in an argument is a statement about the things 
we find valuable. For many people (including academics) the things we value are so self-evident to us 
that we don’t think to state these explicitly in the course of making an argument.  
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should be understood as more or less successful attempts at formulating 
deductive arguments (Groarke, 1999:2, 1). A deductive argument is one where it 
is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. This view lays 
up a certain notion of argumentative success. Fully successful arguments are all 
and only the deductively valid ones (i.e. arguments where we feel compelled to 
believe the conclusion wherever the premises happen to be true). All other 
argument types, whether they be (unsuccessful) deductive forms, or inductive 
arguments or defeasible ones, fall short of this standard and so are said to be 
invalid.16  
Under Deductivism, the act of argument reconstruction involves identifying non-
deductive arguments as failed deductive arguments. These are treated as 
enthymemes, arguments with one or more suppressed premises which must be 
identified to help reconstruct the arguer’s real ‘deductively valid’ intent. The 
assumption is made (via the Principle of Charity) that all arguers are interested in 
one thing – producing successful arguments. The only thing holding them back in 
this respect is their capacity to execute such arguments. Had they the capacity to 
do so, all arguers would produce deductively valid arguments, and it is the task of 
the argument interpreter to charitably uncover this intention. The two things 
holding them back are either lack of skill in logic or else the paucity of the 
materials to hand for constructing premises. 
The would-be Deductivist justifies this approach to argument reconstruction with 
the thought that  
Any arguer is committed to the statement that ‘If the premises of my 
argument are true, then the conclusion is true.’ This follows directly from 
the implications of the speech acts ‘argument’ and ‘assertion.’ For an arguer 
who argues for some conclusion C on the basis of some set of premises 
purports to believe both that C is true and that her proposed premises 
justify this belief. (Groarke, 1999:6) 
When faced with arguments that are not transparently deductive, the would-be 
deductivist looks for acceptable premises that will fill out that argument (Groarke, 
1999:9). The pay-off for adopting a deductivist approach to argumentation, 
recognizing assumptions as unexpressed premises, is that we further “the 
dialectical exchange which is the key to resolving differences of opinion” 
(Groarke, 1999:9). However, what do we say to the people whose views we are 
reinterpreting in this way? What is the preference of our opponents in dialectical 
exchanges: to be credited with potentially valid deductive arguments they never 
made, utilizing premises that they never explicitly (and perhaps never implicitly) 
 
16 In addition to Groarke (1999), Skyrms (1966) offers something like an early statement of proto-
deductivism when he denies the doctrine that there are two different types of arguments, inductive 
and deductive, dividing the world of arguments between them in such a way that every argument falls 
under one and only one category. Instead, there is only one sort of argument, and this is evidenced 
by the fact that all inductively strong arguments are deductively valid. For Skyrms, deductive and 
inductive arguments are not distinguished by the different types of arguments with which they deal, 
but by different standards against which they evaluate arguments. For another description of 
Deductivism, see Blair (1988:17). 
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accepted?17 Or would these people prefer to be credited with flawed arguments 
that flow from their avowed statements? The gain to the ‘dialectical exchange’ 
may entail a real loss to the person whose views are charitably misrepresented. 
In looking for the strongest and best theoretical positions, we stand to lose sight 
of real people and real positions.  
Tindale (2007) suggests that someone invoking a Principle of Charity decides 
“that it would be unfair to attribute an argument to an individual when it is 
unclear that the person intended the argument and the attributed argument 
would be clearly fallacious.” Argument reconstruction is a useful pedagogic tool, 
and one which helps the student see how cases can be built up, and premises 
aligned to support conclusions. However, there are real sensitivities involved 
wherever argument interpretation is taken to the extreme described under 
deductivism. Reconstructions should be handled responsibly, and in such a way 
that we don’t patronise the individuals into whose mouths we are putting words. 
The person reconstructing an argument must ask herself, which would she prefer 
to have attributed to her? Would she prefer to be credited with the intention to 
produce a deductive argument that she lacked the wit or the materials to 
complete? Or would she prefer to be assigned the intention to produce a complete 
but logically flawed argument? And does the fact that an argument offers reasons 
for its conclusion that are less than compelling make that argument in some way 
‘deficient’ or ‘flawed’? The question that all of this raises is, ‘whose arguments’ 
does the reconstruction reveal? Informal logicians wielding the principle of charity 
run the risk of putting the interests of the argument before the interests of the 
arguer. It may be more appropriate to do this in the classroom, as part of an 
informal logic demonstration, than it would be to do this in an academic paper, 
with Hyman’s words ringing in our ears (“academic disputants have a duty to 
write something which adds to the understanding of an issue …. without 




As well as playing a role in the realm of informal logic, the principle of charity will 
be familiar from discussions of radical translation. As discussed by W.V.O.Quine 
and Davidson, the radical translator is the field anthropologist confronted with an 
alien tribe speaking an unfamiliar language. En route to studying the tribe and 
their ways, the anthropologist sets about devising a translation manual for the 
tribesmen’s language. A translation manual will assign a one-to-one mapping 
between sentences of our language and sentences of the target language 
(Risjord, 2000: 36). In cases of radical translation the target language is totally 
unknown and the translator cannot interrogate the natives as a means of finding 
points of agreement. Instead, the translator must construct his manual using the 
 
17 What we have here is a clear violation of the social notion of argumentation identified in Section I 
above. See pages 2-3 above. 
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behavioural evidence that comes with the natives assenting or dissenting from 
sentences in various environmental circumstances (Henderson, 1988:356). In 
such circumstances, where the translator has nothing but the behaviour of the 
natives to guide the mapping of sentences, he has little choice but to operate with 
some principle of charity in assigning beliefs to the natives he studies:  
What matters is this: if all we know is what sentences a speaker holds true, 
and we cannot assume that his language is our own, then we cannot take even 
a first step towards interpretation without knowing or assuming a great deal 
about the speaker’s beliefs. Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with the 
ability to interpret words, the only possibility at the start is to assume general 
agreement on beliefs. (Davidson, 1984:196) 
In the context of radical translation and radical interpretation, the Principle of 
Charity functions as a criterion allowing us to choose between variant translations 
or interpretations. Where one or more of rival translations attribute apparent 
irrationality to the subjects under study, by identifying a set of mutually 
incompatible beliefs held by those subjects, choosing between translations or 
interpretations becomes a sensitive but tricky operation. According to Davidson, 
the Principle of Charity “counsels us quite generally to prefer theories of 
interpretation that minimize disagreement” (Davidson, 1984:xvii) or “maximize 
agreement” (Davidson, 1984:101) between ourselves and those we are 
interpreting. Given the indefinitely large number of sentences we might find 
ourselves assenting to, Risjord suggests interpreting the Davidsonian Principle of 
Charity as the injunction to minimize disagreement (Risjord, 2000: 39). As such, 
the Principle of Charity becomes the principle of minimal disagreement, enjoining 
us to ‘choose the translation that minimizes disagreement between the 
interpreter and native speakers’ (Risjord, 2000: 39). Davidson’s principle of 
charity exhorts us to interpret another speaker’s words in such a way that under 
the assigned interpretation, what the speaker asserts is true by our own lights 
(Ebbs, 2002: 525) and the beliefs of the alien other resemble what our own 
beliefs would be in the circumstances. In what is only a slight departure from 
Davidson’s view, Quine imagines a radical translator constructing translation 
manuals in a way that (a) saves the obvious, and (b) leads us to attribute 
psychologically plausible beliefs to the natives (Henderson, 1988:363).  
Both Quine and Davidson stress that translation and interpretation are impossible 
unless we accept some variant of the principle of charity which assures us of the 
rationality of the persons we study. Thus, whatever else it does, the principle of 
charity invites the would-be translator to assume that the natives operate under 
the same rules of logic as herself. As Risjord points out (2000: 38), this runs the 
risk of exaggerating the natural logical ability of human beings, many of whom 
lack the capacity to maintain large sets of mutually consistent beliefs. As Quine 
pointed out, if a native culture were operating under a prelogical mindset, we 
would not be in a position to discover this as long as we were applying the 
Principle of Charity (Quine 1960: 58).  
 The rationale underpinning the use of the Principle of Charity is plain. Davidson 
makes the assumption that the anthropologist hopes to really understanding the 
alien tribe, their way of life and how they think. This involves assuming (until we 
have evidence to the contrary) that these people share with us a number of 
beliefs, and that we will discover more points of agreement than disagreement in 
our respective world views. Davidson stresses the notion that any points of real 
disagreement between cultures can only emerge once we have focused upon 
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points of similarity across their worldviews or positions. For Davidson, the 
translator’s purpose is to make meaningful disagreement possible and this will 
only happen where there is a foundation in agreement (Davidson, 1984:196-7). 
So the field anthropologist who fails to operate with the principle of charity (by 
stressing the alienness, the ‘otherness’ of these people) will actually defeat the 
purpose of the exercise of trying to understand what is unique to these people. 
This goal, of understanding other people’s views, is one that we as academics 
readily share with the radical translator. Like the would-be radical translator, 
academics who uncharitably misrepresent the beliefs of others engage in 
behaviour that is self-defeating. For uncharitable reconstructions of others’ views 
either offer us no opponents to argue with; or else these give us opponents so 
unlike ourselves and so irrational that they are not worth arguing with. This 
suggests that academics in search of real opponents and real theoretical positions 
to dispute would be well- advised to adopt some principle of charity as part of the 
process of disputation. 
Davidson is confident that we can attribute rational consistency of belief to 
strangers; and this is simply because we have no reason to count anyone as 
having beliefs unless we can construct his beliefs as forming dense and consistent 
clusters (Davidson 1984:200; Glüer, 2006:345). For according to Davidson, 
To see too much unreason on the part of others is simply to undermine our 
ability to understand what it is they are so unreasonable about. (Davidson, 
1984:153) 
The more things a believer is right about, the sharper his errors are. Too much 
mistake simply blurs the focus. (Davidson, 1984:168) 
Given the holistic nature of belief content, massive error becomes impossible – a 
fact which, in the minds of its defenders, confirms the correctness of the Principle 
of Charity as a criterion of radical translation (Risjord, 2000: 43). 
As applied in the realm of radical translation/interpretation, the Principle of 
Charity is not without problems. Henderson (1987:226) argues that Davidson’s 
use of the principle methodologically rules out the possibility of serious 
irrationality or serious disagreement on the part of alien cultures. This is because 
any radical interpreter operating with the principle of charity who found himself 
attributing inconsistent beliefs to the tribesmen would abandon that particular 
manual and begin again. For Henderson, the notion that there could be no serious 
disagreement between ourselves and alien cultures is both empirically implausible 
and contradicts the findings of the social scientist working on the ground. 
Contrary to what Davidson argues, some cultures may be radically unlike us in 
their presuppositions; and we would have no way of recognising and respecting 
this as long as we were operating with Davidson’s understanding of the Principle 
of Charity. Risjord argues that the Principle of Charity functions best as a tool in 
the early stages of translation, but is of limited utility as translation becomes 
‘mature and broadly based’ (Risjord 2000:38 ff.).This is because, in the earliest 
stages of translation, it is correct to assume that any ‘mistakes’ (in the form of 
logically inconsistent clusters of belief-statements generated by the translator) 
are the translator’s own, rather than those of native speakers. However, as 
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Risjord points out, even competent speakers make mistakes; and so the 
presumption that a translation must always eliminate native speaker error is 
dubious (Risjord, 2000: 45).  
Ebbs makes the following observations regarding the concept of charity: 
Unlike trust, charity is something we think of ourselves as exercising only if 
we take ourselves to be in a position superior in some respects to the 
position of the person to whom we aim to be charitable. Given Davidson’s 
conception of what a theory of interpretation is and how such a theory can 
be tested, we have no choice but to regard ourselves as ultimate authorities 
on truth, and to interpret others in such a way that what they say or write is 
compatible with what we already believe. (Ebbs, 2002:539; emphasis in 
original). 
Davidson’s use of the principle of charity in the context of radical translation 
raises once again a problem encountered in the previous section. The problem is 
briefly this: how far can we plausibly go in putting words and beliefs into the 
mouths of others? In imposing maximal rationality upon our opponents, do we 
make them so much like ourselves that we cannot capture genuine difference?18 
If our own set of beliefs determines the bounds of rationality and consistency for 
persons of other cultures or different intellectual backgrounds, does this rule out 
the possibility that we could ever learn anything from these people? As we found 
in the previous section, the principle of charity can always be taken to a point 
where it becomes a tool for patronising those whom it was meant to aid. 
The two notions of the Principle of Charity developed here – as a heuristic device 
in the interpretation of arguments, and as a criterion of acceptable translation – 
are of limited applicability in the arena of academic disputation. In both cases – 
translating arguments or investigating beliefs in a more or less alien society – 
there are important asymmetries with standard academic discourse. As previously 
mentioned, the task of radical interpretation raises particular sensitivities related 
to intercultural contact. In the context of radical translation, the would-be 
translator is an outsider and cultural interloper. The lack of a pre-existing 
translation manual dictates that where our efforts to understand another culture 
are mistaken, those we interpret lack the means to set the record straight. It is 
therefore incumbent upon the would-be radical interpreter to ‘get it right’ the first 
time, and to err on the side of caution by laying potential errors at the door of the 
interpreter rather than the interpretee. By contrast, those writing within the 
academic community always enjoy the prospect of opening up a debate, and one 
with people who are their equals or who can otherwise stand up for themselves. 
The proliferation of academic journals means that academics enjoy the right of 
reply, and can set the record straight on behalf of themselves and others. It is 
because the subjects of radical translation are not (yet) in that fortunate position 
relative to ourselves that we must impose unusually stringent standards of 
fairness in our dealing with alien others. 
 
18 Quine’s variant of the principle of charity directs us to attribute to alien others beliefs which are 
psychologically plausible where this is a matter of plausibility-for-the-subjects, not plausibility-for-us 
(Henderson, 1988:359, 358). As such, the objection raised here does not apply to Quine’s use of the 
principle of charity. 
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Radical translation/interpretation is predicated on a scenario whereby the people 
whose views we are dealing with either are not entirely like ourselves; or else we 
as yet lack the evidence that would allow us to presume that these people are like 
ourselves. By contrast, most academic discourse is between people entirely like 
ourselves. To assume that our academic interlocutors or audience are unlike 
ourselves constitutes a form of academic bad manners. Where there was a richly-
textured background context of assumptions unavailable to us, our attempts to 
recreate and respond to an original paper or argument would be doomed to 
failure. However, academic writers themselves almost always form part of that 
rich contextual background. Where there has been a genuine failure to 
understand the full context of interpretation, any errors of interpretation will be 
quickly corrected in the ensuing literature.  
To some extent, similar comments apply when moving from the arena of radical 
translation to that of informal logic. Here the Principle of Charity enjoins us to 
attribute the best possible arguments to an opponent, even where this involves 
reconstructing an argument using assumptions that are not explicitly stated. This 
procedure is no doubt regularly followed in the informal logic classroom, where 
students new to logic require assistance in dealing with argument and learning to 
make their reasoning explicit. However, helpful measures that win the gratitude 
of undergraduate students would receive a somewhat different reception if 
applied to the written output of one’s colleagues! What seems helpful in one 
context only runs the risk of patronising (belittling) our peers.  
 
VI 
This paper set out to identify and delimit the proper subject matter of an ethics of 
academic discourse. We discovered the territory that such an ethic must range 
across in Hyman’s practical suggestions for those writing refutations. Recasting 
Hyman’s words slightly revealed our primary duties in the area of disputation: 
Those engaged in disputation have a duty to write something which adds to 
the understanding of an issue and makes a constructive contribution to the 
topic of a previous paper by amending, elaborating, or otherwise clarifying 
and expanding issues raised by the target article with a view to persuading 
interested, but previously neutral readers, to their position. Academic 
disputants have a further duty to achieve all of this without disparaging the 
contributions of the original author(s). 
 
This paper also speculated where we might go in search of the principles 
governing fair academic discussion and good disputation. In order to achieve this, 
we considered some of the rules underpinning the good use of argument: 
 
• You should attack intellectual opponents in such a way that you do not 
cause offence. (J.S.Mill) 
 
• In discussing the views and arguments of others, we should operate under 
some form of the principle of charity. 
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These principles were found to be ultimately inadequate in different ways. We 
also noted important asymmetries between the arenas in which the Principle of 
Charity is typically employed and the arena of academic discourse. These 
asymmetries raise some doubts re the usefulness of this principle as part of an 
ethics of academic discourse. At the very least, we should exercise extreme 
caution in applying the Principle of Charity to academic disputation. Thus, as 
befits such a preliminary investigation, our results have been somewhat 
inconclusive. The hard lesson that has emerged at each stage of the enquiry is 
the importance of treating our interlocutors as rational beings. We conclude that, 
whatever else it attempts to do, an ethics of disputation directs us to respect the 
rationality of all participants to an academic debate. 
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